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Introduction
National voting in the Baltic states on joining the European Union revealed substantial differences both between countries and between the regions within each of the three countries.
Latvian citizens were the most active (the Latvian turnout was 72.5% as compared with 63-64% in Estonia and Lithuania), while Lithuanian voters, with 91% voting Yes, were, on average, much more pro-European than voters in Estonia and Latvia, where one out of three voted No. voting Yes and Vilnius district with 81%) would be at the top of the Estonian list and almost as much in favour of enlargement as the most pro-European Latvian districts; the top result in Lithuania was as high as 95%. In both Estonia and Lithuania the gap between the highest and the lowest result is smaller than in Latvia but still substantial at 15 to 16 percentage points.
What are the reasons behind the regional differences in attitudes towards joining the EU?
Why, for instance, did Latgale (which includes eight NUTS 4 regions in the east of Latvia) 
Potential explanations
In Latvia the 'Russian factor' is popularly regarded as an important cause of the regional difference in voting outcomes. The ethnic composition of population may matter for several reasons. Firstly, the occupational (especially in Lithuania) and sectoral (especially in Latvia and Estonia) composition of employment for ethnic minorities is not the same as for the majority ethnic groups (see Table 2 ). Secondly, current political tensions around the forthcoming language reform of secondary education in Latvia, together with the still far from completed naturalisation process in both Latvia and Estonia, might result in a 'protest vote' against the EU just because of the government campaign in favour (such plans were explicitely announced by some organisations in Latvia). Thirdly, the different language groups in each country have been exposed to different information concerning their prospects after accession. In Latvia, for instance, most of the Russian language printed media were clearly campaigning against. On the other hand, some of the best information (e.g. the materials prepared by the Bank of Latvia) were either not distributed in Russian or it was done in the very last moment. Finally, arguments in favour of the EU based on a potential threat from Russia, that were intensively used by the Latvian political elite, were emotionally unappealing to ethnic Russian voters.
As to economic factors, regional differences in prosperity may generate different expectations
. Wage levels and unemployment rates may correlate with expectations, but the direction of these effects is not clear a priori: depressed regions stand to benefit most from the European structural funds, while the advantages of the single market, at least in the short run, are more likely to be exploited by the successful regions. On top of this, residents of depressed regions might be less inclined to vote "as the government wants."
Finally, there may be special factors at work in border regions. Regions bordering with existing EU or new member states may anticipate that accession will generate more benefitial cross-border activities; on the other hand, some groups of border and custom staff stand to lose illegal income. In regions bordering with Russia and Belarus people should expect that the border will become even "harder".
Econometric analysis
Econometric analysis permits the isolation of the effects of ethnic, economic, demographic and geographic factors on voting behaviour. Here we report the results of mulivariate econometric analysis of the determinants of both voting results and turnover by region in each of the three Baltic countries. Table 3 summarises the key variables used in the analysis. All three countries feature strong regional variation in the ethnic composition of population, income and unemployment rates.
The share of the "minority" population (non-Estonians, non-Latvians, non-Lithuanians) in some regions reaches 80% in Estonia, 83% in Latvia and 90% in Lithuania. Maximum income exceeds minimum by a factor of 2 in Estonia and by 2.5 in Latvia and Lithuania (range of log income 0.6 and 0.9 respectively). Regional unemployment rates vary from 8% to 21% in Estonia, from 4% to 28% in Latvia and from 4% to 20% in Lithuania 2 .
The results of the analysis are presented in Tables In Latvia Russians were more opposed to the enlargement than other minorities; other minorities, however, were less active than Russians, especially in the cities. In Lithuania a 10 percentage point difference in the share of ethnic Russians (respectively, Poles) resulted in a 2.7 (respectively, 1.2 to 1.3) percentage points lower proportion of Yes votes; other minorities did not significantly affect the results.
In all three countries income had a positive and highly significant effect both on voting results and on turnout. In Estonia a 10 percent higher regional income implies, other things being equal, a 2 percentage point higher proportion of votes in favour for EU; in Lithuania this effect is only half as strong, while in Latvia it was slightly stronger than in Estonia (2.5 points).
Unemployment effects are less robust and differ across countries. In Estonia (respectively, Latvia) a 10 percentage points higher unemployment rate implied, other things being equal, about a 5 pecentage points higher (respectively, 2 percentage points lower) proportion of Yes votes, but these effects were significant only at a 10% level and in Lithuania the 2 The income and unemployment measures used in the analysis differ slightly across countries. Only registered unemployment rates are available at the NUTS 4 level in Latvia and Lithuania (these rates refer to the month before the referendum), while for Estonia we have Labour Force Survey rates from 2001 (later data were not available at county level). For Estonia average disposable income per household member was used as the income variable, while for Latvia and Lithuania average gross monthly wages were used. Hereafter these indicators are referred to as "unemployment" and "income" for all countries.
unemployment effect was not significant at all. In Latvia unemployment also had a significant (negative) effect on turnout.
Population density or share of urban population was controlled for in most of the models, but only in Lithuania this was a significant determinant of turnout and voting results (more urbanised regions were more active and more pro-European, but the size of the effect was small).
Border region effects are quite interesting. In Estonia and Latvia, after accounting for Lithuanian districts on the borders with Poland and Belarus, taken separately, did not differ significantly from the inner districts, but when all border regions (including the ones on the Latvian border but excluding the ones next to the Kaliningrad oblast of Russia) are taken together, they appear to be significantly (1.6 percentage points) less pro-European than the other municipalities.
In each of the countries we have found some regions where the behaviour of voters was significantly different from the general pattern. The most striking example is the city of Liepaja in Latvia, where, depending on the other controls used, turnout was 3.5 to 5
percentage points higher and the vote in favour of the EU was 17 to 19 percentage points higher than elsewhere. Is it chance or has the fact that Liepaja is the home city of current Latvian Prime-Minister, Einars Repše, played a role? In Estonia, Tartu County delivered about 4.5 percentage points above expected proportion of votes in favour, most likely because of the large population of students in the city of Tartu. Ignalina district, the location of Lithuania's nuclear power station, has the highest average earnings in Lithuania, but the proportion of Yes votes was one of the lowest in the country (10 percentage points below expected). In Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital, the results were much the same as the national average, while the high wages in the capital city should have generated a 3 percentage point higher vote.
Concluding remarks
The main results of the analysis are that in each of the three Baltic Countries, other things being equal, high income regions were significantly more pro-European than low-income ones, while regions with a high share of ethnic minorities were significantly more opposed to the enlargement than other regions. The ethnic effect was strongest in Latvia and weakest in Estonia. These findings clearly indicate necessity of stronger efforts both in integration of the Baltic societies and in the promotion of reliable EU information, especially in less developed regions. In Latvia and Estonia the regions bordering with Russia or Belarus were substantially less in favour of EU membership than other regions (controlling for ethnic composition and economic factors). In Latvia, regions on the borders with EU accession countries were significantly more pro-European than other regions.
By accounting for ethnic and geographic factors our analysis extends the results of Doyle and Fidrmuc (2003) for Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Estonia. We have confirmed their finding that the support for EU membership does not come primarily from regions and groups that are likely to benefit from EU-wide redistribution. (LVL, 2000 and LTL, 2001 respectively Estonia (2003 ), Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (2003a , 2003b ), Statistical Department of Lithuania (2003a , 2003b Estonia, 2003) and official referendum results (Estonian National Electoral Committee, 2003) (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, 2003a , 2003b (Statistical Department of Lithuania, 2003a , 2003b and official referendum results (Central Electoral Committee, Republic of Lithuania, 2003) .
